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Abstract
In this paper we introduce two new classes of weighted values for coalition structures with
related extensions to level structures. The values of both classes coincide on given player
sets with Harsanyi payoffs and match therefore adapted standard axioms for TU-values
which are satisfied by these values.
Characterizing elements of the values from the new classes are a new weighted pro-
portionality within components property and a null player out property, but on different
reduced games for each class. The values from the first class, we call them weighted Shap-
ley alliance coalition structure values (weighted Shapley alliance levels values), satisfy the
null player out property on usual reduced games. By contrast, the values from the sec-
ond class, named as weighted Shapley collaboration coalition structure values (weighted
Shapley collaboration levels values) have this property on new reduced games where a
component decomposes in components of lower levels (these are singletons in a coalition
structure) if one player of this component is removed from the game. The first class con-
tains the Owen value (Shapley levels value) and the second class includes a new extension
of the Shapley value to coalition structures (level structures) as a special case.
Keywords Cooperative game ·Weighted Shapley coalition structure values ·Weighted
Shapley levels values · Weighted proportionality within components · Dividends
1 Introduction
Whereas e. g. companies, governments or political organizations are mostly structured
strong hierarchical and in a statical manner supply chains or electricity and other networks
have often a more dynamical and not so strong top down frame work. For hierarchical
organized structures Winter (1989) developed a model, called level structure, that is an
extension of a coalition structure (Aumann and Dre`ze, 1974). Therefore Winter (1989)
introduced his value, we name it Shapley levels value, that is an extension of the Owen
value (Owen, 1977), itselves an extension of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b). A level
structure consists of ordered partitions (the levels) of the original player set. Each parti-
tion consists of disjoint coalitions of players (the components) such that each component
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2of a level higher that contains a player from a component of the lower level must contain
all players of this component. So in a level structure the lowest level contains all the
singletons as components and the highest level contains the grand coalition as the only
component.
Vidal-Puga (2012) introduced an interesting weighted value for coalition structures,
extended by Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011) to level structures1. There the weights
are given by the size of the coalitions. This value does not satisfy the null player property.
The size of coalitions may be a considerable magnitude that is to take into account
by sharing the payoff in a cooperative game. But often also other factors, e. g. in the
context of cost allocation, play a decisive role: the size of firms or departments, political
influence, fixed costs of the units, spent time of working members and so on. Levy and
McLean (1989) and McLean (1991) extended the weighted Shapley values (Shapley, 1953a)
to coalition structures for such arbitrary weights which don’t depend on the coalition
function. The main class of these values, in Dragan (1992) called McLean weighted
coalition structure values, is extended to level structures in Besner (2018), called weighted
Shapley support levels values. There the hierarchy of the level structure is treated more
statically. If a subcoalition of a component deals with other coalitions outside of this
component the subcoalition is supported by the weight of the whole component. In
general, without further statement, it is not clear how to go on if a player is removed from
the player set meaning what are the weights of the new components in the new game. In
this respect, the Shapley levels value forms an exception within this class of values. It can
be easily be treated also dynamically since in a game where some players are removed its
weights are the same as before, they are always equal.
To handle also weighted values for level structures in the same manner we introduce
the class of weighted Shapley alliance levels values (weighted Shapley alliance coalition
structure values). There the weights are not only assigned to components, each subset of
a component owns a weight too. If a player is removed from a component the remaining
players build a new component with the weight of the coalition of these players. Thus
here the coalitions within a component can act more independently in the corset of a level
structure. They can act with players outside of the component without support of the
whole component but all involved players of a component form always an alliance. The
weighted Shapley alliance levels values coincide with payoff vectors from the Harsanyi set
(Hammer, 1977; Vasil’ev, 1978), called Harsanyi payoffs, and inherit, for fixed player sets,
all properties of these payoff vectors adapted to level structures. Interestingly, the Shapley
levels value (Owen value) is a special case of these values too. So our axiomatization gives
also deeper insight into this value. A characterizing element of the weighted Shapley
alliance levels values is a null player out property. If we delete a player of a component
this doesn’t influence the payoff to the other players.
In some situations it is possible that if a player leaves a component the component loses
its cohesion. For such situations the values from our second new class, called weighted
Shapley collaboration levels values (weighted Shapley collaboration coalition structure
values) are recommended. Especially if a null player is removed from a component and
the coalition of the remaining players of this component is smashed in the next smaller
components. Here the payoff to all players is the same as before in the game with the
complete player set. If some players of a component B are involved in a bargaining situa-
1In this context it is also worth mentioning the paper of Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2010).
3tion with players from outside of B all players which form the next largest subcomponent
of B collaborate together. So the players of a component can act more independently too.
Here, similar as by the weighted Shapley support levels values, only the components need
a weight. As a special case of these values we single out a new extension of the Shapley
value to level structures, named Shapley collaboration levels value (Shapley collaboration
caolition structure value).
Whereas the Shapley levels value and the value in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011)
satisfy the level game property (the payoff to all players of a component sum up to the
payoff to the component in a game where components are the players) the values from our
new classes don’t satisfy this property in general. The absence of this characteristic reveals
that in our new classes the players are more independent from a nesting component.
A level structure with only two levels coincides with a coalition structure. Thus all
presented axioms and so the given axiomatizations coincide with related axioms and
axiomatizations formulated for coalition structures. Therefore we deal in this paper with
coalition structures only marginally and concentrate on level structures so that in this
respect the reader has to transform adequate results by his own.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some prelim-
inaries and section 3 presents the axioms. In the main part of this paper we introduce
in section 4 the weighted Shapley alliance levels values, in section 5 the weighted Shapley
collaboration levels values and, as a special case, in section 6 the Shapley collaboration
levels value. An example in section 7 compares the proposed values, section 8 gives the
conclusion and an appendix (section 9) provides all the proofs.
2 Preliminaries
We denote by R the real numbers and by R++ the set of all positive real numbers. Let U
be a countably infinite set, the universe of all players, and N the set of all non-empty and
finite subsets of U. A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-game) is a pair
(N, v) consisting of a set of playersN ∈ N and a coalition function v : 2N→ R, v(∅) = 0,
where 2N is the power set of N . Subsets S ⊆ N are called coalitions, v(S) is the worth
of coalition S and the set of all nonempty subsets of S is denoted by ΩS. The set of all
TU-games with player set N is denoted by VN. The restriction of (N, v) to the player
set S ∈ ΩN is denoted by (S, v).
Let (N, v) ∈ VN and S ⊆ N . The dividends ∆v(S) (Harsanyi, 1959) are defined
inductively by
∆v(S) :=
{
v(S)−∑R(S ∆v(R), if S ∈ ΩN, and
0, if S = ∅.
A game (N, uT ), T ∈ ΩN, with uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S and uT (S) = 0 otherwise for all S ⊆ N
is called an unanimity game. It is well-known that any coalition function v on N has
a unique presentation
v =
∑
T∈ΩN
∆v(T )uT . (1)
We call a coalition S ⊆ N active in v if ∆v(S) 6= 0. Player i ∈ N is called a null player
in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S), S ⊆ N\{i}; players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are called (mutually)
4dependent (Nowak and Radzik, 1995) in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all
S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
A coalition structure B on N is a partition of the player set N , i.e. a collection
of nonempty, pairwise disjoint, and mutually exhaustive subsets of N . Each B ∈ B is
called a component and B(i) denotes the component that contains a player i ∈ N . A
level structure (Winter, 1989) on N is a finite sequence B := {B0, ...,Bh+1} of coalition
structures Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1, on N such that:
• B0 = {{i}: i ∈ N}.
• Bh+1 = {N}.
• For each r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, Br is a refinement of Br+1, i. e. Br(i) ⊆ Br+1(i) for all i ∈ N .
Br is called the r-th level of B; B is the set of all components B ∈ Br of all levels Br ∈
B, 0 ≤ r ≤ h; Br(Bk) is the component of the r-th level which contains the component
Bk ∈ Bk, 0 ≤ k ≤ r ≤ h+ 1.
The collection of all level structures with player set N is denoted by LN. A TU-game
(N, v) ∈ VN together with a level structure B ∈ LN is an LS-game (N, v,B). The set of
all LS-games on N is defined by VLN. Each TU-game (N, v) corresponds to an LS-game
(N, v,B0) with a trivial level structure B0 := {B0,B1} and each LS-game (N, v,B1),
B1 := {B0,B1,B2}, corresponds to a game with coalition structure (Aumann and Dre`ze,
1974), discussed as ”games with a priori unions” in Owen (1977).
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, and T ∈ ΩN : From a level structure on N
follows a level structure on T by eliminating the players in N\T . With coalition structures
Br|T := {B ∩ T : B ∈ Br, B ∩ T 6= ∅}, 0 ≤ r ≤ h + 1, the new level structure on T is
given by B|T := {B0|T , ...,Bh+1|T} ∈ LT and (T, v,B|T ) ∈ VLT is called the restriction
of (N, v,B) to player set T .
A TU-value φ is an operator that assigns to any (N, v) ∈ VN a payoff vector φ(N, v) ∈
RN, an LS-value ϕ is an operator that assigns payoff vectors ϕ(N, v, B) ∈ RN to all LS-
games (N, v, B) ∈ VLN.
We define WN := {f : N → R++} with wi := w(i) for all w ∈WN and i ∈ N as the set
of all positive weight systems on the player set N , we define W2N := {f : 2N\∅ → R++}
with wS := w(S) for all w ∈ W2N, S ∈ ΩN, as the set of all positive weight systems on
all non-empty coalitions S ⊆ N and we define WB := {f : B → R++} with wB := w(B)
for all w ∈ WB, B ∈ B, as the set of all positive weight systems on the components of all
levels r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, of a level structure B.
Let (N, v) ∈ VN and w ∈W. The (simply) weighted Shapley value2 Shw (Shapley,
1953a) is defined by
Shwi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
wi∑
j∈S wj
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N.
If all weights are equal we obtain, as a special case of a weighted Shapley value, the
Shapley value Sh (Shapley, 1953b), given by
Shi(N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
∆v(S)
|S| for all i ∈ N.
2We desist from possibly null weights as in Shapley (1953a) or Kalai and Samet (1987).
5We introduce the Shapley levels value with a formula presented in Calvo, Lasaga and
Winter (1996, eq. (1)). Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, and for all T ∈ ΩN,
T 3 i,
KT (i) :=
h∏
r=0
KrT (i), where
KrT (i) :=
1
|{B ∈ Br : B⊆ Br+1(i), B ∩ T 6= ∅}| .
The Shapley Levels value ShL (Winter, 1989) is given by
ShLi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
KT (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N. (2)
It is easy to see that ShL coincides with Sh if B = B0.
All values above are or coincide with payoff vectors from the Harsanyi set (Hammer,
1977; Vasil’ev, 1978), also called selectope (Derks, Haller and Peters, 2000), where the
payoffs are obtained by distributing the dividends. The payoffs φpi in this set, titled
Harsanyi payoffs, are defined by
φpi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
pSi ∆v(S), i ∈ N,
where the pSi are non-negative weights in a sharing system p = (p
S
i )S∈ΩN, i∈S and sum up
to 1 for each coalition S. The collection PN on N of all such dividend share systems
p is given by
PN:=
{
p = (pSi )S∈ΩN, i∈S
∣∣∣ ∑
i∈S
pSi = 1 and p
S
i ≥ 0 for each S ∈ ΩN and all i ∈ S
}
.
3 Axioms
We refer to the following axioms for LS-values which are simple adaptions of standard-
axioms for TU-values:
Efficiency, E. For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN, we have ∑i∈N ϕi(N, v,B) = v(N).
Null player, N. For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN and i ∈ N a null player in v, we have
ϕi(N, v,B) = 0.
Null player out, NO3. For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN and j ∈ N a null player in v, we have
ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕi(N\{j}, v,B|N\{j}) for all i ∈ N\{j}.
Additivity, A. For all (N, v,B), (N, v′,B) ∈ VLN, we have
ϕ(N, v,B) + ϕ(N, v′,B) = ϕ(N, v + v′,B).
Winter (1989) introduced a symmetry between components axiom to characterize his
value. There the sum of the payoffs to all players of a component equals the sum of the
payoffs to all players of another component if both components are in the same level,
3This axiom is an extension from ”null player out” in Derks and Haller (1999).
6are subsets of the same component one level higher and both components are symmetric
players in a game where the components are the players. Besner (2018) used a similar
axiom to characterize the weighted Shapley support levels values. Unlike as before there
the components must be dependent in the game where the components are the players.
Then the sums of the payoffs to all players of both components are in the same proportion
as the weights of the components. Here we present a new similar axiom. The only
difference as before: now all players of the components must be dependent in the originally
game instead of the components in the game with the components as players.
Weighted proportionality within components, WPWC4. For all (N, v,B) ∈
VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, w ∈ WB, Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk) and
all i ∈ Bk ∪B` are dependent5, we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)
wBk
=
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B)
wB`
.
The following axiom is a special case of the previous one.
Dependency within components, DWC. For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1},
Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk) and all i ∈ Bk ∪ B` are dependent in v,
we have ∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B).
4 Weighted Shapley alliance levels values
The Shapley levels value, the value in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011) and the Shapley
support levels values (Besner, 2018) satisfy the level game property. That means that the
total payoff to all players of a component coincides with the payoff to the component if
we would play a game where the components are the players itselves. But this is not
the case6 for our two new classes of weighted values7. The values in these classes allow
the players, within the hierarchy of the level structure, to act more independently. So in
the following class they can form subgroups with an own weight within the components
containing them.
E. g., looking to a game where the whole world is the grand coalition. The world
splits up in political unions like the European Union (EU) and countries which remain
fully autonomous. Within the EU many countries are organized as a federal state or a
comparable system and so on. But within the EU are also powerful subgroups possible
like the euro area. Assume that we have found a weight system for the political influence
4In Nowak and Radzik (1995) the basic version of this axiom for TU-values is called ”ω-mutual depen-
dence”.
5A coalition S such that all players i ∈ S are dependent in v is called a ”coalition of partners” in v (Kalai
and Samet, 1987), known also as ”partnership”.
6We show that this property is not satisfied in our example in section 7.
7Both classes are a special case of values for level structures proposed in Besner (2016) as f -weighted-ALS-
Shapley-values and f -weighted-SLS-Shapley-values respectively. Also exists a working paper (Besner,
2017) where these classes are discussed.
7and power of all countries, states and so on and all possible cooperations of these units.
Using a weighted Shapley support levels value the euro area throws, outside of the EU,
the same weight as the whole EU into the balance! Instead, the following class of values
assigns the euro area exactly the weight it has itself. The structure of the level structure
determines here that always the involved players within a component act together as a
single unit outside of the component.
Definition 4.1. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, w ∈ W2N 8 and for all T ⊆ N,
T 3 i,
Aw,T (i) :=
h∏
r=0
Arw,T (i), where (3)
Arw,T (i) :=
wBr(i)∩T∑
B∈Br:B⊆Br+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T
.
The weighted Shapley alliance levels value ShwAL is given by
ShwALi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
Aw,T (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N. (4)
Of particular interest in the next theorem are the null player out property and the weighted
proportionality within components property. In many cases it seems convincing that if a
null player who obtain a payoff of zero should not affect the payoff to the other players
if he leaves the game. The property that all players of two components are dependent
means that no one outside of these components is interested to join a coalition of these
players if not all players of these components are contained in the coalition and all players
of both components must act together to obtain anything at all. Then the property that
the sum of the payoffs to players of the first component in proportion to the weight of
the first component equals the sum of the payoffs to players of the second component in
proportion to the weight of the second component cannot be too bad for a weighted value
for level structures.
Theorem 4.2. Let w ∈ W2N. The weighted Shapley alliance levels value ShwAL satisfies
E, N, NO, A and WPWC.
For the proof, see appendix 9.1. We obtain an axiomatization of the weighted Shapley
alliance levels values which corresponds in case of a trivial level structure to an axioma-
tization of the weighted Shapley values too.
Theorem 4.3. Let w ∈ W2N. ShwAL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E, NO,
WPWC and A.
For the proof, see appendix 9.2. We have an interesting special case if the weights are
the size of the components. It seems quite naturally that forming components within a
hierarchical structure has no effect to the payoff to players if the component possesses as
a whole the same weight as the parts in the sum.
Proposition 4.4. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} and w ∈ W2N such that
wS = |S| for all S ∈ ΩBh for all Bh∈ Bh, wS ∈ w. Then we have
ShwALi (N, v,B) = Shi(N, v) for all i ∈ N.
For the proof, see appendix 9.3.
8In fact, we need only weights for coalitions S ∈ ΩBh for all Bh∈ Bh.
84.1 A new characterization of the Shapley levels value and the Owen value
If all weights are equal, the coefficients Aw,T (i) from def. 4.1 equal the KT (i) in eq. (2)
from the definition of the Shapley levels value. Thus the Shapley levels value (Owen
value) is a special case of a weighted Shapley alliance levels value (weighted Shapley
alliance coalition structure value). We obtain, if we replace in the proof of theorem 4.3
WPWC by DWC the following corollary.
Corollary 4.5. ShL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E, NO, DWC and A.
Remark 4.6. Since a level structure (N, v,B1) ∈ VLN, B1 := {B0,B1,B2}, coincides with
a coalition structure on N we obtain a new axiomatization of the Owen value (Owen,
1977) if we adapt E, NO, DWC and A to games with a coalition structure.
5 Weighted Shapley collaboration levels values
Mostly, if players form hierarchical structured coalitions (here called components) and
a player of such a component is removed from the game, the remaining players of this
component form a new component that replaces the old component and so the structure
of the level structure remains largely intact. In the preliminaries we called the new level
structure a restriction of the old one. But sometimes it is thinkable that the compo-
nent loses its cohesion. We will not go so far that the whole level structure breaks apart
completely. The cohesion from components outside of the broken one and all complete
components which are subsets of the remaining player set of the broken component re-
mains unchanged. So we introduce an internally, by the remaining components, induced
restriction of the old level structure.
Definition 5.1. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} and T ∈ ΩN : We denote by
BrI |T , 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1, the coalition structure on T, named internally induced r-th level
of (N, v,B) to player set T , given by
BrI |T :=
{
{T}, if r = h+ 1,{
B ∈ B : B ⊆ (Br∩ T ), Br∈ Br, B * B′∈ B, B′⊆ (Br∩ T )}, else.
With the level structure BI |T = {B0I |T , ...,Bh+1I |T} ∈ LT the LS-game (T, v,BI |T ) ∈ VLT
is called the internally induced restriction of (N, v,B) to player set T .
The internally induced r-th level BrI |T of a level structure to a player set T consists always
of all largest components of the original level structure which are subsets of T and subsets
of a component of the r-th level of the original level structure.
Now we can formulate a new null player out axiom that uses internally restrictions.
Internal (induced restriction) null player out, INO. For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN, j ∈ N a
null player in v, we have ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕi(N\{j}, v,BI |N\{j}) for all i ∈ N\{j}.
9In the following class of weighted Shapley levels values the subgroups of a component
which are a component of a lower level can act more independently. For instance, we
look at the regions of Europe, the regions merge to independent countries and most of
the countries are members of the EU or autonomous nations like Norway. The Nordic
Council is a geo-political forum where Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden
are full members. Assume also here, e. g., that we have found a weight system for the
political influence and power of all countries, states and so on which build a component
in the sense of a level structure. Denmark, Finland and Sweden are also members of the
EU, but neither within the Nordic Council nor in the EU these countries act together as
a component. So the coalition of these countries have not a weight support, given by the
EU, as by the weighted Shapley support levels values, nor they form an alliance with an
own weight as by the weighted Shapley alliance levels values. Within the Nordic Council
each of these countries act autonomous as a single component and thus each country owns
only its own weight. The following class of values supports such situations.
Definition 5.2. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, w ∈ WB and for all T ⊆ N,
T 3 i,
Cw,T (i) :=
h∏
r=0
Crw,T (i), with (5)
Crw,T (i) :=
wBrT(i)∑
B∈B̂r+1T (i)
wB
,
where BrT (i) is the largest component of all components B`(i), 0 ≤ ` ≤ r, with B`(i) ⊆ T,
Bh+1T (i) := T and
B̂r+1T (i) :=
{{BrT (i)}, if BrT (i) = Br+1T (i),{
B ∈ B : B ( Br+1T (i), B * B′ ∈ B, B′ ( Br+1T (i)
}
, else,
is the set of all largest components which are subsets of Br+1T (i). The weighted Shapley
collaboration levels value ShwCL is given by
ShwCLi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
Cw,T (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N. (6)
A difference between the weighted Shapley alliance levels values and the weighted Shapley
collaboration levels values lies in satisfying a different null player out property.
Theorem 5.3. Let w ∈ WB. The weighted Shapley collaboration levels value ShwCL
satisfies E, N, INO, A and WPWC.
The proof is omitted because it is completely analogous to the proof of theorem 4.2. Also
the following axiomatization extends an axiomatization of the weighted Shapley values
and resembles theorem 4.3 of the weighted Shapley alliance levels values.
Theorem 5.4. Let w ∈ WB. ShwCL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E, INO,
WPWC and A.
The proof is omitted because it is completely analogous to the proof of theorem 4.3. Also
here we obtain an interesting special case if the weights are the size of the components.
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Proposition 5.5. Let (N, v,B) ∈ VLN and w ∈ WB such that wB = |B| for all B ∈ B,
wB ∈ w. Then we have
ShwCLi (N, v,B) = Shi(N, v) for all i ∈ N.
Again the proof is omitted because it is completely analogous to the proof of proposi-
tion 4.4.
6 The Shapley collaboration levels value
As a special case of the weighted Shapley collaboration levels values we can present an
extension of the Shapley value to level structures.
Definition 6.1. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} and for all T ⊆ N, T 3 i,
CT (i) :=
h∏
r=0
CrT (i), with
CrT (i) :=
1∣∣B̂r+1T (i)∣∣ ,
where BrT(i) is the largest component B`(i) of all level `, 0 ≤ ` ≤ r, B`(i) ⊆ T , Bh+1T (i) := T
and B̂r+1T (i) :=
{
B ∈ B : B ⊆ Br+1T (i), B * B′ ∈ B, B′ ( Br+1T (i)
}
is the set of all largest
components which are subsets of Br+1T (i). The Shapley collaboration levels value
ShCL is given by
ShCLi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
CT (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N.
Def. 6.1 coincides with def. 5.2 if all weights are equal. If we replace WPWC by DWC,
we obtain, similar to corollary 4.5 the following corollary.
Corollary 6.2. ShCL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E, INO, DWC and A.
7 Example
In this section we give a numerical example to compare the sharing for different values
presented in this paper where we refer to example 1 in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011).
To show that the new classes of values don’t satisfy the level game property, this means
that the total payoff of all players of a component equals the payoff to this component in
a game where the components are the players we set this property, introduced in Winter
(1989): Let (N, v,B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} and T ∈ ΩN. We define for each level
r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, the level structure Br := {Br0, ...,Brh+1−r} ∈ LBr as the induced r-th level
structure from B by considering the components B ∈ Br as players. There all levels
from the original level structure lower then r are dropped and we have Brk := {{B ∈ Br :
B ⊆ Br+k} for all Br+k∈ Br+k}, 0 ≤ k ≤ h+ 1− r.
11
If T =
⋃
B⊆T B, B ∈ Br, and we want to stress this property, T is denoted by T r. Each
such T r is related to a coalition of all players B ∈ Br, B ⊆ T r, in the induced r-th level
structure, denoted by T r := {B ∈ Br : B ⊆ T r} and vice versa. Then the induced r-th
level game
(Br, vr,Br) ∈ VLBr , where Br is the player set with B ∈ Br as players, is
given by
vr(T r) := v(T r) for all T r∈ ΩBr.
For a level structure B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN and an induced r-th level structure Br
related components have the same weights. So we have for all r, k, 0 ≤ r ≤ k ≤ h,
Br
k−r∈ Brk−r, Brk−r∈ Br, Bk∈ Bk, Bk∈ B,
w
Brk−r = wBk with B
rk−r:= {B ∈ Br: B ⊆ Bk} and w
Brk−r ∈ WB
r
, wBk ∈ WB.
We present the desired property.
Level game property, LG (Winter, 1989). For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B =
{B0, ...,Bh+1}, B∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1, we have∑
i∈B
ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕB(Br, vr,Br).
We come finally to the example: Let (N, uS, B) ∈ VLN, w ∈ W2N and w′ ∈ WB,
where N := {1, 2, 3, 4} and B = {B0,B1,B2,B3}, with B1 := {{1}, {2, 3}, {4}}, B2 :=
{{1, 2, 3}, {4}} and uS the unanimity game with carrier S := {1, 2, 4}. Assume that the
weights are exogenous given and reflect, e. g., the political power or something else of
the coalitions. For the weight system w′ we use the same weights for the components as
given in the weight system w so that we have w′B = wB for all B ∈ B; for calculating the
weighted Shapley value Shw we use the weight system w, given by wi := w{i} for all i ∈ N
and w{i} ∈ w. Since S = {1, 2, 4} is the only active coalition in the game for computing
we need only the following given weights:
w{1} = w{2} = w{3} = 1, w{4} = 4, w{1,2} = w{2,3} = 3, w{1,2,3} = 5.
We obtain Table 1 where φL is the value for level structures presented in Go´mez-Ru´a and
Vidal-Puga (2011).
Table 1: Payoffs of different values
Value Payoff to player 1, 2, 3, 4 ϕ{1,2,3}(B2, v2,B2)
∑
i∈{1,2,3} ϕi(N, v,B)
Sh(N, v) 1
3
, 1
3
, 0, 1
3
- -
Shw(N, v) 1
4
, 1
4
, 0, 1
2
- -
ShL(N, v,B) 1
4
, 1
4
, 0, 1
2
1
2
1
2
φL(N, v,B) 1
4
, 5
12
, 1
12
, 1
4
3
4
3
4
ShwSL(N, v,B) 5
36
, 5
12
, 0, 4
9
5
9
5
9
ShwAL(N, v,B) 3
14
, 3
14
, 0, 4
7
5
9
3
7
ShwCL(N, v,B) 1
6
, 1
6
, 0, 2
3
5
9
1
3
ShCL(N, v,B) 1
3
, 1
3
, 0, 1
3
1
2
2
3
We see, in difference to the other presented values for level structures, the Shapley alliance
levels values and the Shapley collaboration levels values don’t match in general the level
game property.
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8 Conclusion
The rapidly increasing volume of collected data and global networking make it possible
and necessary to share benefits between cooperating participants, often structured hier-
archical. To distribute generated surpluses the presented two new classes of LS-values,
together with the weighted Shapley support levels values, contain alternatives to the
Shapley levels value if there exist exogenous given weights for some coalitions.
The weighted Shapley support levels values meet the level game property but subcoali-
tions of a component always depend on the weight of the whole component. Our two new
classes of values offer an alternative, particularly if some players are removed from the
game, especially null players. Missing the level game property is the price that is to pay.
But this is a sign that the level game does here not reflect the complete bargaining on
subcoalitions, they are more independent from nesting components.
If we use the restriction of an LS-game (the extended restriction as normally used for
coalition structures), the weighted Shapley alliance levels values satisfy the null player
out property and contain the Shapley levels value as a special case. So this paper also
opens different perspectives on the Shapley levels value. But a level structure is more then
just a sequence of coalition structures, the coalition structures are ordered in a certain
way. Thus we could present a new internally induced restriction, which should be used for
example in the case that a component splits in the components next in size if one player
quits the component. The weighted Shapley collaboration levels values satisfy the null
player out property for internally induced restrictions. So we have found a situation where
the Shapley levels value fails and a new extension of the Shapley value, called Shapley
collaboration levels value, fits best.
Since an LS-game (N, v,B1) corresponds to a game with coalition structure the transfer
of definitions, axioms and axiomatizations to coalition structures is left to the reader.
9 Appendix
The following lemma is used in the proofs of theorem 4.2 and theorem 4.3.
Lemma 9.1. Besner (2018, lemma 7.3) Players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are dependent in v ∈ GN,
iff ∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0, k ∈ {i, j}, for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
9.1 Proof of theorem 4.2
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, w ∈ W2N and Arw,T the expressions according to
def. 4.1.
• E, N, A: Let T ∈ ΩN, j ∈ T. It is easy to show, by induction on r, that
∑
i∈Br+1(j), i∈T
r∏
`=0
Arw,T (i) = 1.
So
∑
i∈T Aw,T (i) = 1 and, since Aw,T (i) > 0, i ∈ T, the Aw,T (i) form a dividend share sys-
tem p ∈ PN and ShwAL coincides with a Harsanyi payoff on a fixed player set. Therefore
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ShwAL satisfies all for level structures simply adapted axioms on a fixed player set which
are, as related TU-axioms, satisfied by a Harsanyi payoff, in particular E, N and A are
well-known matched axioms.
• NO: It is well-known that each coalition S ∈ ΩN, containing a null player j ∈
N in v, is not active in v. In eq. (4) we have only to consider active coalitions. But
for these coalitions there is no change in the weights. Thus we have ShwALi (N, v,B) =
ShwALi (N\{j}, v,B|N\{j}) for all i ∈ N\{j}.
• WPWC: Let k, ` ∈ N, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, Br(`) ⊆ Br+1(k) and all players i ∈ Br(k) ∪ Br(`)
be dependent in v. We obtain
∑
i∈Br(k)
ShwALi (N, v,B)
wBr(k)
=
Def.
4.1
1
wBr(k)
∑
i∈Br(k)
∑
T⊆N,
T3i
[ h∏
j=0
wBj(i)∩T∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T
]
∆v(T )
=
Lem.
9.1
1
wBr(k)
∑
i∈Br(k)
∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
[ h∏
j=0
wBj(i)∩T∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T
]
∆v(T )
=
1
wBr(k)
∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
∑
i∈Br(k)
[ h∏
j=0
wBj(i)∩T∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T
]
∆v(T )
=
1
wBr(k)
∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
∆v(T )
[
h∏
j=r
wBj(k)∩T∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(k),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T
·
∑
i∈Br(k)
r−1∏
j=0
wBj(i)∩T∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T
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]
=
1
wBr(k)
∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
∆v(T )
h∏
j=r
wBj(k)∩T∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(k),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T
=
∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
∆v(T )
h∏
j=r+1
wBj(k)∩T∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(k),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T
=
∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
∆v(T )
h∏
j=r+1
wBj(`)∩T∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(`),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T
=
∑
i∈Br(`)
ShwALi (N, v,B)
wBr(`)
.
Convention 9.2. To avoid cumbersome case distinctions in the proof of theorem 4.3
using WPWC, if there is only one single player assessed in isolation, she is defined as
dependent by herself. Then WPWC is trivially satisfied.
9.2 Proof of theorem 4.3
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, w ∈ W2N, S ∈ ΩN arbitrary and ϕ an LS-value
that satisfies all axioms of theorem 4.3 and N, because E and NO imply obvious N. Due
9The last sum always equals 1, if r = 0, we have an empty product, which is equal, by convention, to the
multiplicative identity 1.
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to theorem 4.2, property (1) and A, it is sufficient to show that ϕ is uniquely defined on
the game vS := ∆v(S) · uS.
All players j ∈ N\S are null players in vS and so ϕ is unique on vS for all j ∈ N\S
by N. All players i ∈ S, possibly using conv. 9.2, are dependent in vS and, by NO, we
obtain ϕi(N, vS,B) = ϕi(S, vS,B|S) for all i ∈ S.
So we can use an induction on the restriction to the player set S on the size m, 0 ≤ m ≤ h,
for all levels r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, with m := h− r.
Initialisation: Let m = 0 and so r = h. We get for an arbitrary i ∈ S∑
B∈Bh|S ,
B∩S 6=∅
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B|S) =
(WPBC)
∑
B∈Bh|S ,
B∩S 6=∅
wB
wBh|S(i)
∑
j∈Bh|S(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B|S) =
(E)
∆v(S)
⇔
∑
j∈Br|S(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B|S) =
[ h∏
k=h−m
wBk|S(i)∑
B∈Bk|S :B⊆Bk+1|S(i),
B∩S 6=∅
wB
]
∆v(S). (7)
Induction step: Assume that eq. (7) holds to ϕ with an arbitrarym−1, 0 ≤ m−1 ≤ h−1
(IH). It follows for an arbitrary i ∈ S∑
B∈Br|S , B∩S 6=∅,
B⊆Br+1|S(i)
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B|S) =
(WPBC)
∑
B∈Br|S , B∩S 6=∅,
B⊆Br+1|S(i)
wB
wBr|S(i)
∑
j∈Br|S(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B|S)
=
(IH)
[ h∏
k=h−m+1
wBk|S(i)∑
B∈Bk|S :B⊆Bk+1|S(i),
B∩S 6=∅
wB
]
∆v(S)
⇔
∑
j∈Br|S(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B|S) =
[ h∏
k=h−m
wBk|S(i)∑
B∈Bk|S :B⊆Bk+1|S(i),
B∩S 6=∅
wB
]
∆v(S).
So ϕ is uniquely defined on vS (take m = h and so r = 0).
9.3 Proof of proposition 4.4
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, and w ∈ W2N such that wS = |S| for all S ∈ ΩBh
and all Bh∈ Bh, wS ∈ w. We have only to show that
Aw,T (i) =
1
|T | for all T ⊆ N, T 3 i.
For all T ⊆ N, T 3 i, and 0 ≤ r ≤ h the set B˜r+1T (i) := {B ∩ T : B ∈ Br, B ⊆
Br+1(i), B ∩ T 6= ∅} is a partition of Br+1(i) ∩ T . So we have∑
B∈B˜r+1T (i)
wB∩T =
∑
B∈Br:B⊆Br+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T = |Br+1(i) ∩ T |.
By eq. (3) we get Aw,T (i) =
1
|T | as desired.
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9.4 Logical independence
All axiomatizations must also hold if B = B0. In this case all axioms, used for axiomatiza-
tion in this paper, coincide with usual axioms for TU-values. So the given axiomatizations
coincide in this case with axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values and the Shapley
value, respectively. It is well-known or easy to proof that in this case the used axioms are
logical independent. Therefore all axioms for LS-values must be also logical independent
in the given axiomatizations.
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